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1 ‘To try’ (til prøve) in Norwegian refers to 
the fact that the lawyer in question (in this 
instance, each lawyer) is not authorized for 
Supreme court trials, and that this is a case 
in which the lawyer will try to be approved 
for and be evaluated for such approval.
Criminal offence; hacking; ‘cloud’ (online) 
storage of personal digital data; data 
protection; data controller; privacy
The Supreme Court – Judgement.
Criminal law. Data Intrusion. Application of the law. For 
purpose of gain. Privacy.
The penalty for violation of the criminal code § 145, 
second paragraph was set to imprisonment for one 
year, nine months were suspended. The defendant was 
convicted for breaking into private individuals’ e-mail 
accounts, including downloaded intimate pictures, to 
have gained access to private information on a computer 
that he had been handed in for repair, and hacking to 
an American company by that he had downloaded large 
amounts of customer information. The requirement for 
purposes of gain, see Penal Code. § 145, third paragraph, 
was met by the defendant to the burglary who had 
acquired data on a variety of people, which were of 
economic value. When he had received a password 
and computer and had access to inspect machine in its 
entirety, he could not be convicted on the criminal code § 
145 for having gained access to the data that were open to 
him. He was acquitted of the charges under the Personal 
Data Act, because he could not be considered a data 
controller by law. The requirement for publication under 
criminal code § 390 was not satisfied by the defendant’s 
acquisition of data. Redress Claims for Damages Act § 3-6, 
then could not be awarded.
Delivered: 31.10.2012 in Case HR-2012-2056-A
Procedure: Oslo District Court TOSLO-2010-62157 – Court 
of Appeal LB-2011 – m102720 – Supreme Court HR-2012-
2056-A, (Case No. 2012/969), criminal appeal against 
judgment.
Parties: I: The Public Prosecution (Attorney Geri Evanger 
– to try) to A (attorney Knut Helge Hurum – to try). II: 
A (attorney Knut Helge Hurum – to try) to the Public 
Prosecution (Prosecutor Geir Evanger – to try).1 
Judges: Noer, Øie, Bårdsen, Bergsjø, Schei.
(1) Judge Noer: This case concerns a conviction for 
hacking. It raises questions about the interpretation 
of Penal Code § 145, second paragraph about the data 
breach, and whether the defendant acted for gain. 
Furthermore, the case deals with the question whether 
the defendant can be convicted for violation of the 
Personal Data Act, and whether the victim can claim 
damages for non-economic loss due to the violation of the 
right of privacy by data breach. There are also questions 
about compensation for financial losses.
(2) The Public Prosecutors Office initiated an indictment 
on 26 March 2010 against A for various allegations in 
connection that A had gained access to electronically 
stored information mainly through hacking.
(3) Indictment count I concerned violation of Penal Code 
§ 145, second paragraph and had five subsections, where 
the principal points can be summarised as follows:
(4) Count I a concerned the penetration of one or more 
unknown servers, where the defendant had copied the 
information about the e-mail address, password and/or 
username and personal photos etc. Count I b concerned 
improper intrusion in 187 e-mail accounts and the 
retrieval of information and pictures from these. Count 
I c concerned the defendant obtaining access to private 
information on a computer that he had been handed 
over for repair. Count I d applied to hacking the server to 
the web site of the company Photobucket Inc, where the 
defendant had stolen the personal data, including user id, 
password, and e-mail addresses of over 66 million users. 
Count I e concerned hacking and retrieval of information 
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from the customer register of the company registered as 
Siteman AS.
(5) The defendant’s motive for the actions was, according 
to the District Court’s judgment, ‘to obtain intimate 
pictures he would not otherwise have access to.’ The 
defendant’s four computers contained more than 30,000 
images, including some that were pornographic in nature.
(6) A was also charged with violation of the Copyright Act 
and the Personal Data Act (counts II, III and IV). These 
items were primarily based on the fact that the defendant 
had copied and saved the same information.
(7) Oslo District Court ruled on 5 April 2011 
(TOSLO-2010-62157). The defendant was sentenced 
in accordance with the charge (with the exception of 
part of count I e) to imprisonment for one year, whereof 
nine months were suspended. He was ordered to pay 
compensation to the company Photobucket Inc in the 
amount of 126,308.50 kroner and damages for non-
economic loss to five victims of 30,000 kroner each. In 
addition, he was awarded court costs against to the public 
at 400,000 kroner.
(8) A appealed to the Borgarting Court of Appeal. The 
appeal concerned the application of law under conviction 
for the indictment of count I c, III and IV and the issue, 
of the sentencing for damages for non-economic loss, 
and the amount of compensation and the decision of the 
litigation costs.
(9) The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 30 March 2012 
(LB-2011-102720) and acquitted the accused for item 
count I c, discounted the claims by Photobucket Inc to 
109,325 kroner and acquitted the defendant of the claim 
for damages for non-economic loss. The costs of the court 
were reduced to 10,000 kroner. Otherwise, the appeal was 
rejected.
(10) The judgment is as follows:
‘1 A born *. * .1981, acquitted of the matters mentioned 
in the indictment count I c).
2. A is convicted for violation of Penal Code § 145 
second ref first and third paragraphs (four issues), 
Copyright Act § 54, first paragraph, letter b), see third 
paragraph, the Personal Data Act § 48 subsection 
f), see § 20 cf. § 19 and Personal Data Act § 48 first 
paragraph letter a), ref § 31 first paragraph letter a) and 
second paragraph, all seen together with Penal Code 
§ 62 first paragraph and § 63, second paragraph, to 
imprisonment for one – one – year. The enforcement of 
9 – nine – months of the sentence suspended by Penal 
Code § § 52-54 with a probation period of two years.
To offset in the unconditional part of the sentence is 
two – two – days spent in custody.
3. In compensation to Photobucket.com Inc, A shall 
pay compensation of 109,325 – one hundred and nine 
thousand three hundred and twenty five – Kroner plus 
statutory interest from the due date until payment is 
made. The due date is two weeks from the judgment.
4. A is acquitted for demands for non-economic 
damage from B, G, H, I and J.
5. A must accept the confiscation of a Linux server and 
a Silver Stone computer that were seized.
6. The costs to the district court are set to 10,000 – ten 
thousand – kroner.”
(11) The Public Prosecutors Office has appealed to the 
Supreme Court over the application of the law on the 
question of guilt regarding the indictment on count 
I c and application of the law relating to the claims 
for compensation and non-economic damages. The 
defendant has appealed against the application of the 
law under conviction for count I a, b, d and e, count III and 
count IV. He also appealed against the application of the 
law in relation to the decision of the claim for monetary 
damages by Photobucket Inc. The appeals were fully 
taken under consideration by the Supreme Court.
(12) I have concluded that the appeals should partially 
succeed.
(13) Count Ic – If A is punishable under the Criminal Code 
§ 145, second paragraph for unjustified to have gained 
access to data
(14) The reason for this indictment is that the aggrieved 
gave his computer and login password to the defendant 
so that he would fix virus problems on her computer. 
The defendant took the opportunity to go in and copy 
private information on the PC. The High Court referred to 
the court’s description of the alleged offense, where the 
events are quoted as follows:
‘Cohabitants to B is a work colleague with A. B had a 
laptop Fujitsu computer with which there was trouble. 
The cohabitant knew that A was clever with computers, 
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and has also helped others with such problems. The 
defendant agreed to help, and got the computer 
delivered at his home. They got it back not long 
afterwards.
Upon review of the seizure of the data made at A’s, 
the police found the password of B to log into the 
e-mail account at getmail.no. The police also found the 
following information that was saved: her old e-mail 
address, her co-habitant’s e-mail address, national 
identity number, the user name of her co-habitant’s 
daughter and her e-mail address, account number and 
credit card number. The police also found photographs 
of B and her daughter, and the addition of her co-
habitant’s daughter. These were images that were 
stored on B’s computer, but they were now also found 
as copies on the defendant’s computer.’
(15) The question is whether the issues at hand are 
punishable under the Criminal Code § 145 first and 
second paragraph, which reads as follows:
‘Anyone who illegally is breaking letter or other 
closed writing or in a similar way obtain access to the 
content, or makes his way to another person’s locked 
repository, is punishable by fines or imprisonment for 
up to 6 months or both.
The same applies to a person who unwarranted makes 
his way to data or computer programs stored or 
transmitted by electronic or other technical means.’
(16) The prosecutor has alleged that the weight of legal 
interpretation must be in the ‘unjustified’ category: If the 
defendant was not entitled to obtain access to the stored 
data, and he still does, he has in the legal sense gained 
unauthorised access to the data and is affected by the 
provision. The defendant contends on his side that he was 
granted access to the PC and password. The information 
was then available to him, and he is in a legal sense given 
legitimate access.
(17) I consider that there is no doubt that the defendant by 
his actions was given access to ‘data’ within the meaning 
of the provision. The concept, according to the legislative 
history interpreted broadly ‘includes all kinds of 
information, e.g. about the personal, technical or financial 
issues,’ cf Ot.prp.nr.35 (1986-1987) on page 20. It is also 
clear that the provision applies to the gaining of access 
to the data – there is no requirement that the perpetrator 
is familiar with or has used the above information in any 
way.
(18) The second paragraph, however, affects only the 
person who ‘without justification gains access’ to stored 
information. To determine whether this condition is 
fulfilled here, I find it necessary to go any further into 
background of the provision.
(19) Penal Code § 145 originally referred to the illegally 
of breaking into a letter or a closed writing. But by Act of 
16 February 1979 No. 3, a provision was added that made 
it a criminal offence to gain access to the contents of a 
closed communication or note when this was otherwise 
only available using special equipment to connect, play, 
screening, reading or the like. A condition for it being a 
legal offence was that the notice or record was ‘closed’, 
and that access was unauthorised, see Ot.prp.nr.4 (1978-
1979) page 10.
(20) By Act of 12 June 1987 No. 54, § 145 was amended 
to the direction of the current wording, but with a 
requirement that unjustified access was obtained ‘by 
violating a protection or in a similar way.’ The amendment 
was intended to make clearer that the provision is 
directed against unauthorised access to computerised 
data, and was not meant to imply substantial changes of 
substance, cf Ot.prp.nr.35 (1986-1987) page 15.
(21) The provision was revised again by Act of 8 April 
2005 nr 16. The Ministry proposed initially to maintain the 
requirement that the unlawful access must have occurred 
by breaking a protection or in a similar manner. However, 
Parliament removed the condition, and referred to a 
written submission from ØKOKRIM to the proposition for 
the revision, regarding the need to provide for information 
theft regardless of whether the offender violated a 
protective measure to obtain such access, cf Innst.O.nr.53 
(2004-05) page 5. The condition that the person in 
question ‘without justification gains access to data or 
programs’ was nevertheless retained.
(22) The new data breach provisions in § 204 of the Penal 
Code of 2005 will replace § 145, second paragraph in 
respect of electronically stored information and reads:
‘With a fine or imprisonment up to 2 years any person 
who by violating a protection or otherwise unjustified 
method gains access to a computer system or part of 
it.’
(23) It is stated in the preparatory works of the provision 
that ‘the provision continues in effect the Penal Code of 
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1902, § 145, second paragraph, as far as it concerns data 
which is stored,’ cf Ot.prp.nr.22 (2008-2009) page 403.
(24) This is deepened in the following way:
‘This provision affects the very act that provides 
access to the computer system. Further use of the 
system, such as search and mapping of information 
contained on a computer, may be considered as illegal 
use. Modification or deletion of data and information 
found on the system, may be covered by the vandalism 
provisions.’
(25) The preparatory work emphasises that the 
perpetrator can only be punished if he has either violated 
a means of protection or has obtained access to all or 
part of the computer system in any other unauthorised 
manner, see page 403 of the bill:
‘It is not a condition that the break-in occurs by 
breaking a protection, cf “or in any other unauthorised 
manner”. Since violation of a protection is likely to 
be the most practical, this is however mentioned 
especially in the Act. The reservation regarding 
unlawfulness “unjustified” continued from Penal Code 
of 1902 § 145, second paragraph.’
(26) These preparatory works of a provision that 
is intended to have a content corresponding to § 
145, second paragraph, must be given weight in the 
interpretation of this provision. I therefor find it correct 
to apply the interpretation of the law that is reflected in 
relation to the new provision, to the interpretation of § 
145, second paragraph. It is on this basis it is clear that 
the defendant here received a password, and computer 
and access to inspect the machine in its entirety, which 
must mean that he has not gained unauthorised access 
to the data which after login lay open to him. He may, in 
my view, not be considered to have gained unauthorised 
access to information ‘by other unauthorised practice’.
(27) The defendant had in addition to investigate the 
information that was stored on the PC, also installed a 
program on the computer, which enabled easy access 
to stored passwords, etc. The prosecutors have alleged 
that the defendant may nevertheless be punished for that 
part of the information which he acquired through the 
program.
(28) Counsel for the defendant has stated that the 
program enabled easy access to passwords etc for the 
defendant, but without enabling him through this to 
obtain access to areas of the computer that was password 
protected or protected in other way. It was fully possible 
to find the information without the program, at least 
for a computer-literate person. The prosecutor has not 
commented on this presentation. As this is the situation, I 
cannot see that any violation of § 145, second paragraph 
of the data were obtained using the search program.
(29) Another issue is that it is clear that A was not entitled 
to transfer the information to his own PC, but that is a 
different issue than comprised by the indictment.
(30) I have come to the conclusion that the defendant 
cannot be punished for violation of the Penal Code § 145, 
second paragraph under item I c, and that the appeal from 
the prosecution at this point must be rejected.
(31) Whether the acquisition of data has occurred for gain, 
Penal Code § 145 subsection three
(32) Penal Code § 145 subsection three raises the penalty 
when the accused has inflicted injury or acted with 
purpose of profit, and reads as follows:
‘If harm is done by acquisition or use of such 
unwarranted knowledge, or the crime is committed 
for the purpose to obtain any improper gain, 
imprisonment for up to 2 years may be used.’
(33) The City Court with respect to all the factors in count 
I found the defendant acted with purpose of profit, and 
that harm was caused, and consequently that § 145 
subsection three was applicable. The assessment that the 
data burglaries caused damages is not challenged, and I 
therefore find that § 145 subsection three shall apply to 
all counts – regardless of whether there is any purpose of 
profit or not.
(34) The Court of Appeal, outside of the appeal, 
considered the question of whether it was right that there 
was a purpose of profit, but agreed with the City Court 
that the defendant had had purpose of gain by the data 
burglaries covered by counts I a, b, d and e. Counsel for 
the defendant has argued that the interpretation of the 
law and the form of procedure by the High Court at this 
point is wrong.
(35) I cannot see how the Court of Appeal in considering 
whether the defendant acted with the purpose of 
profit has interpreted the law incorrectly. It is generally 
assumed that when a person without authority obtains 
goods with economic value for his own use, he profits 
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regardless of what kind of personal motive he or she has. 
Illustrative of this is Rt-1968-626, where the Supreme 
Court found that a defendant who had obtained womens 
wear for sexual motives, had acted for gain. The same 
should apply even if the owner – as in this case – is 
not deprived of any asset. The decisive factor must be 
whether the perpetrator unlawfully obtains an economic 
good, and not that the owner suffers a loss, see the 
comparison Rt 1975-473.
(36) By hacking i.e. of customer records, the defendant 
gained access to data regarding a vast number of people. 
The Court of Appeal has assumed that this mass of 
information has economic value, and that the defendant 
acted for gain in the performance of computer break-ins. 
This is in my view a correct application of the law.
(37) I find no reason to go further into the question of the 
defendant’s copy of the private photographs that may be 
deemed to have occurred for the purpose of gain.
(38) Can the defendant be convicted of a violation of the 
Personal Data Act?
(39) The Court of Appeal found the defendant guilty 
on charges III and IV, which involved violation of the 
Personal Data Act § 48 subsection f, cf § 20 cf. § 19 and 
the Personal Data Act § 48 subsection a, cf § 31 first 
paragraph letter a and second paragraph. The offense 
was – in brief – that the defendant stored the personal 
information he had unlawfully gained access to, without 
informing those concerned about this and about who was 
the Data Controller, and without sending a notification to 
the Data Inspectorate.
(40) Both the prosecution and the defense have claimed 
acquittal on these counts. The prosecutor has stated that 
the provision to the indictment is directed towards the 
‘Data Controller’ in the meaning of the law. The term is 
defined in § 2, paragraph 4 as ‘the one who determines 
the purpose of the processing of personal data and the 
tools to be used.’ In the view of the prosecution it is not 
natural to regard the defendant as a ‘Data Controller’ 
under the Act.
(41) Counsel for the defendant has agreed to this, 
and also argued that the defendant’s actions must be 
regarded as ‘processing of personal data carried out by an 
individual for merely personal or other private purposes,’ 
which are exempt from the provisions of the law under § 
3, second paragraph.
(42) The defendant had in this case unlawfully copied 
the personal data of millions of people and transferred 
the information to himself. The information was stored 
on his personal server, and according to the provided 
information, nobody else had access to it.
(43) I agree that the Personal Data Act does not apply 
in such a situation, and that the defendant cannot 
reasonably be viewed as ‘Data controller’ by law. 
Although the collection of data is beyond what may be 
considered normal personal activities, the definition and 
discussion of what is meant by ‘Data Controller’ and the 
delimitation in § 3, in my view shows that the defendant 
cannot be punished for violation of the mentioned 
provisions when the processing – as here – exclusively 
concerns clearly illegally collected and stored information.
(44) A consequently must be acquitted of violation of the 
Personal Data Act.
(45) Sentencing
(46) The defendant is convicted of four violations of Penal 
Code § 145 second cf first and third paragraphs, and for 
violation of the Copyright Act § 54 first paragraph letter 
b cf subsection three. It is the defendant’s data break-
in which causes the sentence in this case. It concerns 
serious computer crime, which has resulted in harm to 
the aggrieved in the form of loss of reputation to the 
companies and anxiety and discomfort to the individuals 
as a result of private information that has gone astray.
(47) The defendant was, in the Court of Appeal, sentenced 
to imprisonment for one year, nine months of which were 
suspended. He has now been acquitted for violation of the 
Personal Data Act, which does not have an effect on the 
sentence. The sentence set by the Court of Appeal is in my 
view not too strict.
(48) Compensation for non-economic loss to the victims
(49) Claims have been made by five of the aggrieved 
individuals in the case for damages for non-economic 
loss. The claims have been substantiated by the facts that 
the defendant unlawfully copied private information and 
intimate pictures of the victims or their closely related. 
For four of them this happened by the defendant entering 
their e-mail accounts and transferred attachments, etc to 
his own server. For the fifth victim this occurred when the 
defendant should have repaired her computer.
(50) A claim for non-economic loss requires a foundation 
in law, cf-1986-1326 at page 1344. The claims are here 
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made with reference to the Damages Compensation Act § 
3-6, which reads:
‘The person who has offended a person’s honour and 
personal privacy, shall, if he has shown negligence or if 
conditions for sentence are present, pay compensation 
for the damage sustained and such compensation 
for loss of future earnings as the court, having regard 
to the degree of guilt and other conditions finds 
reasonable. He may also be ordered to pay such 
compensation (damages) for non economic loss as the 
court deems reasonable.’
(51) There is no doubt that the defendant obtained access 
to information of a private nature in the legal sense, and 
that he acted intentionally. Counsel for the defendant 
has referred to Penal Code § 390 and argued that it 
requires that the violation of privacy has occurred at 
‘public announcement’ see definition in Penal Code § 7, 
paragraph 2 of the term ‘public’. This is also referred to 
as the publication criteria. The defendant has not made 
public any private information, and demands for redress 
therefore depend on whether under § 3-6 is a requirement 
that the publication requirement in Penal Code § 390 is 
met. The provision reads:
‘Anyone who violates the privacy by giving public 
notice of any personal or domestic circumstances 
will be subject to fines or imprisonment for up to 3 
months.’
(52) I shall first look at the legislative history of the 
provision of redress. This originally appeared in the Penal 
Code Enforcement Act § 19 and authorised demands for 
redress inter alia when someone had committed libel 
against his better judgment according to Penal Code § 
248. By Act of 10 March 1939, the right claims for redress 
extended to include violations of privacy according 
to Penal Code § 390. The authority to require redress 
for non economic damages were included in § 390, 
second paragraph, by reference to § 254, and it followed 
implicitly from the provisions that redress would be 
relevant where the violation had occurred in the public 
according to § 390.
(53) In 1958, the rules regarding redress were moved 
from criminal law back to the Penal Code Enforcement Act 
§ 19a, cf act of 12 December 1958 No 1. The preparatory 
work specified that the conditions for claims for redress 
for non economic damages would be the same as before, 
cf Ot.prp.nr.5 (1958) page 8. But it was no longer following 
from the wording that a violation of § 390 was a condition 
for compensation.
(54) The rules regarding redress for non economic loss 
were then moved to the Act on torts § 3-6, and the 
provision in subsection got its present wording, cf Act of 
25 May 1973 No 26. Once again it was made clear in the 
preparatory works that this did not involve any material 
change of rules, see Ot.prp.nr.4 (1972-1973).
(55) It follows from what I have said that the Act’s history 
suggests that redress for non-economic loss for the 
infringement of privacy can only be sentenced when 
the publication requirement under § 390 is met. This is 
also how the provision has been interpreted in practice, 
cf-Rt 2006-799, where the Supreme Court discusses the 
condition of ‘public communication’ in section 46-50. 
Also in Rt-2010-258, the Supreme Court without further 
assumption based its decision on that redress for non 
economic loss presupposes that the infringement has 
taken place in a public notice under the Criminal Code § 
390, see paragraph 43 of the judgment.
(56) The prosecutor has referred to statements in Rt-
2008-489 Section 42 and Rt-2008-1089 paragraph 34, 
which seem to allow that the application of § 3-6 can be 
somewhat broader than what follows from Penal Code 
§ 390. In these cases, however, it was clear that the 
information had been presented in public, and I cannot 
see that representations can be given emphasis here.
(57) The prosecutors have pointed out that article 8 
ECHR on the right to respect for family and private life 
requires states to protect citizens against interference 
with the privacy by the authorities. The provision would 
also require measures to protect against interventions 
by other private entities or individuals, see the European 
Court (ECHR) judgment in Case ES against Sweden (Case 
5786/08) (EMD 2008-5786) paragraph 57. The States’ 
obligations under article 8 will normally be met if the 
wrongful act is punishable under national law, see ECHR 
judgment Stubbings and Others v the United Kingdom 
(Case 22083/93 and 22095/93 (EMD-1993-22083 and 
EMD-1993-22095)) paragraph 66. On this background I 
cannot see that the relationship to the ECHR constitutes 
crucial guidance for the case here.
(58) On this basis, it must be taken as a basis that unless 
otherwise required by the present Convention obligations 
of Norway, that claims for redress for non-economic 
damages for the infringement of privacy can only be 
imposed when the publication requirement of § 390 is 
met. The defendant’s actions have not been published, 
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and the appeal against the High Court’s judgment on this 
point must be rejected.
(59) I find reason to add that policy considerations in 
my view may suggest that § 3-6 should be able to apply 
for this type of violation of privacy, even if the violation 
has not been published. Many people currently have 
extensive private information stored electronically, and to 
find that unauthorised hacking into the e-mail accounts or 
obtaining access to other electronically stored personal 
information, will for most be experienced as a very 
unpleasant invasion of one’s privacy. This is therefore 
an issue that could be the reason for the legislature to 
consider.
(60) Claims for financial expenses from Photobucket Inc
(61) Photobucket Inc is a U.S. company that offers online 
storage of digital images and videos. The defendant 
hacked into the company’s customer database and 
gained access to the personal information of more 
than 66 million of its users. During efforts to uncover 
the relationship and pursue it in Norway, the company 
instructed engineer Svein Ingvar Willassen to go through 
the logs and other information in preparation for report of 
the crime to the police. Willassen invoiced 22,500 kroner 
to the company.
(62) Photobucket Inc in addition hired the lawyer Arve 
Føyen. He assisted the company in the matter and acted 
as a liaison to the police. Føyen invoiced Photobucket Inc 
86,825 kroner for the work.
(63) Photobucket Inc presented a claim that the 
defendant had to cover the costs and expenses resulting 
from additional work caused to employees in connection 
with the discovery of and cleaning up after the data 
break in. The High Court accepted the claim with respect 
to payments to Willassen and Føyen, and awarded 
Photobucket Inc compensation totalling 109,325 kroner.
(64) The defendant has appealed the High Court decision 
regarding the claim for compensation. It is argued that it 
is the police who investigate criminal offenses, and that 
costs of private investigation is beyond what is protected 
by the law on torts. In the defendant’s view, it is in reality 
legal costs, for which the aggrieved party is not entitled 
to reimbursement. Anyway, the size of the claim is 
unforeseeable.
(65) I have concluded that the appeal partially should 
be accepted. The rules regarding coverage of claims for 
compensation and reimbursement of litigation costs 
are different. The question is therefore whether the 
costs should be viewed as legal costs, see the Criminal 
Procedure Act § 439, or whether it is civil claims ‘arising 
out of the same acts as the case concerns’, see the 
Criminal Procedure Act § 3, and which are treated 
according to Chapter 29. If it is a question of legal costs 
related to the pursuit of the civil claim, the aggrieved party 
has basically no claim for reimbursement when the claim, 
as here, is presented by the prosecution, see Penal Code§ 
439, second paragraph, cf Andenæs, Norwegian Criminal 
Procedure, 4th edition page 609.
(66) The boundary between the two types of claim is not 
clear. It is in theory supposed that costs incurred prior to 
the writ of summons to a certain degree may be classified 
as both legal costs and damages, cf Schei et al Sivil 
Procedures Act (2007) page 928.
(67) I find that in the present case is clear that the cost 
of engineer Willassen may be claimed as an ordinary 
tort claim. The cost of technical assistance was entirely 
incurred prior to the writ of summons and are of relatively 
modest size. As the Court of Appeal I assume find that 
it is foreseeable and natural for an American company 
which is exposed to hacking by a perpetrator in a foreign 
country, engages a data expert assistance in this country. 
This was necessary in order to clarify what had happened.
(68) Also, the bulk of the costs of legal assistance should 
be viewed the same way. Most of this work could be 
characterised as expenses incurred in direct connection 
with the review of the offense. I refer to the fact that 
it concerned a foreign aggrieved party and a type of 
crime that is difficult to reveal by the police without 
close cooperation with the aggrieved party. It was such 
a collaboration lawyer Føyen performed on behalf of 
victims. The expenses which were incurred by presenting 
a civil claim for compensation must be seen as legal costs. 
I find that Photobucket Inc judgment must be awarded 
60,000 kroner of the legal expenses that involvement of 
lawyer Føyen meant for the company.
(69) This means that the defendant’s appeal partially 
is upheld, and that compensation to Photobucket Inc 
reduced to 82,500 kroner.
(70) I vote for this.
Judgment:
In the Appeal Court judgement is made the following 
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changes:
1. A is acquitted of breach of the Personal Data Act § 48 
subsection f, cf § 20 cf. § 19 and the Personal Data Act 
§ 48 subsection a, cf § 31 first paragraph a, and second 
paragraph.
2. In compensation to Photobucket Inc A shall pay 82,500 
– eighty two thousand five hundred – kroner within 2 – 
two – weeks from service of this judgment, in addition 
to the general interest for overdue payments according 
to the Act regarding interest on late payments § 3, first 
paragraph, first sentence from the end of the compliance 
deadline until payment is made.
(71) Judge Øie: I am in in agreement with the first justice 
for the substantial parts and in the decision.
(72) Judge Bårdsen: Likewise.
(73) Judge Bergsjø: Likewise.
(74) Justice Schei: Likewise.
(75) Following the voting, the Supreme Court made this 
judgment:
In the Appeal Court made the following changes:
1. A is acquitted of breach of the Personal Data Act § 48 
subsection f, cf § 20 cf. § 19 and the Personal Data Act 
§ 48 subsection a, cf § 31 first paragraph a, and second 
paragraph.
2. In compensation to Photobucket Inc A shall pay 82,500 
– eighty two thousand five hundred – kroner within 2 – 
two – weeks from service of this judgment, in addition 
to the general interest for overdue payments according 
to the Act regarding interest on late payments § 3, first 
paragraph, first sentence from the end of the compliance 
deadline until payment is made.
With thanks to Arve Føyen for reviewing this translation.
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